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8	IN THE WATER COURTS OF THE STATE OF MONTANA UPPER AND LOWER MISSOURI RIVER DIVISIONS
9	FORT PECK COMPACT SUBBASIN
10	In the Matter of the)
11	Adjudication of Existing) Cause No. WC-92-1 and Reserved Rights to the)
12	Use of Water, Both Surface) and Underground, of the)
13	Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes) of the Fort Peck Indian)
14	Reservation Within the) State of Montana.
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16	STATE OF MONTANA'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS OBJECTIONS AND
17	TO APPROVE FORT PECK-MONTANA COMPACT
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19	The Attorney General of the State of Montana submits the
20	following memorandum in support of its Motion to Dismiss
21	Objections and to Approve Fort Peck-Montana Compact, submitted
22	herewith.
23	
24	INTRODUCTION
25	In accordance with Mont. Code Ann. §§ 85-2-701 to -705
26	(1993), the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission
27	reached a compact with the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the

2/2 8/97



1 Fort Peck Indian Reservation ("Tribes"). Pursuant to Mnt. Code 2 Ann. § 85-2-702 the Fort Peck-Montana Water Rights Compact 3 ("Compact") was ratified by the Montana Legislature, 1985 Mont. 4 Laws, ch. 735, § 1, codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 85-20-201 5 (1993).

The tribal water right ("TWR") recognized in the Compact 6 7 is summarized in the Summary Description of Fort Peck Tribal Water Right, served upon all claimants in the diversionary 8 basins in accordance with the Court's April 6, 1994 Findings of 9 Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Commencement of Special 10 Proceedings for Consideration of Fort Peck-Montana Compact 11 ("Commencement Order"), and will not be repeated here. The 12 early history of this case was also set forth in the 13 Commencement Order and will likewise not be repeated. Pursuant 14 to the Commencement Order, a Notice of Entry of Fort Peck-15 Montana Compact Preliminary Decree and Notice of Availability 16 was issued and served in accordance with Mont. Code Ann. 17 § 85-2-233 in all of the basins comprising the Special Fort 18 Peck Compact Subbasin. The Notice of Availability gave 19 individuals in those basins until October 3, 1994 to file 20 objections. On or before that date objections were filed by 21 three individuals: Gladys Connie Flygt, Jeff D. Weimer, and 22 23 Paul Tihista. The State's present motion requests the Court to dismiss those objections and approve the Compact in accordance 24 with Mont. Code Ann. §§ 85-2-233(6) and -702(3). 25

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ARGUMENT

- I. NONE OF THE OBJECTORS HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY HAVE WATER RIGHTS OR OTHER COGNIZABLE LEGAL INTERESTS THAT ARE HARMED OR ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE COMPACT.
 - A. <u>Paul Tihista Lacks Standing to Challenge the Compact</u> <u>Because He Does Not Have A Water Right and Has</u> <u>Otherwise Failed to Show What Cognizable Legal</u> <u>Interest He Seeks to Vindicate</u>.

7 Paul Tihista filed an objection to the Compact which can 8 most charitably be described as evidencing general disagreement 9 with the decision in <u>Winters v. United States</u>, 207 U.S. 564 10 (1908). Apart from the doubtful merit in that position, 11 Mr. Tihista's objection fails primarily because he lacks an 12 "ownership interest" in water or its use that is necessary to 13 give him standing to challenge the Compact.

Montana Code Annotated § 85-2-233(1)(a) provides that 14 "[f]or good cause shown . . . a hearing must be held before the 15 16 water judge on any objection to a . . . preliminary decree . . . " That same statute goes on to define "good cause" 17 as requiring the objector to provide "a written statement 18 19 showing that a person has an ownership interest in water or its use that has been affected by the decree." Mont. Code Ann. 20 21 § 85-2-233(1)(b); see also Water Court Procedural Rule 1.II(7). The records at the Montana Department of Natural Resources 22 and Conservation indicate that, while Mr. Tihista 23 had originally filed several statements of claim in 24 the adjudication, he has since transferred any interest he has in 25 26 those claims to another party. (See Affidavit of James E. Kindle ["Kindle Aff.'], Attach. 3.) DNRC's records do not 27

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otherwise indicate that Mr. Tihista has any permitted post-73 1 (Kindle Aff., ¶ 3.) Mr. Tihista has not 2 water rights. 3 otherwise indicated what "ownership interest" in water he seeks to vindicate or protect by his objection.¹ Absent such a 4 5 written showing he has not established "good cause" for his objection. See generally Fort Hall Water Users Ass'n v. United 6 States, 921 P.2d 739, 742 (Idaho, 1996) (non-Indian water users 7 8 association that did not file claim in adjudication lacked standing to object to Fort Hall Indian Water Rights Agreement). 9 It should accordingly be dismissed. 10

B. <u>The Remaining Objectors Have Not Shown How Their</u> <u>Ownership Interests In Water Are Affected by The</u> <u>Compact</u>.

14 Connie Flygt and Jeff Weimer each have statements of claim 15 on file with DNRC. (See Kindle Aff., ¶ 2.) Mr. Weimer has two 16 water rights in Basin 40E (Missouri River between Musselshell 17 River and Fort Peck Dam): a 1965 use right and a 1982 18 permitted right, both on an unnamed tributary Seven Blackfoot 19 Creek. (Kindle Aff., Attach. 2.) Both rights are for

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'The State does not mean to imply that the only "ownership 21 interest cognizable under Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-233(1)(b) is a private proprietary right to use water. Among other things, 22 such a construction of § 233(1)(b) would be inconsistent with Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-233(1)(a)(I), which provides the State 23 standing to object to temporary preliminary with and 24 preliminary decrees in order to protect the public's interest. See Mont. Const. Art. IX, § 3(3) ("[a]11 . . . waters within 25 the boundaries of the state are the property of the state for the use of its people . . ."). 26 However, Mr. Tihista's objection does not require the Court to address this question 27 since it fails to explain in any manner what interest he seeks to vindicate or his right to do so.

stockwater purposes and involve small on-stream reservoirs
 designed to catch spring runoff. <u>Id.</u> The amount of the 1965
 right is 30 gallons per day per animal unit (unspecified), and
 the amount of the 1982 right is 8.0 acre feet per year. <u>Id.</u>
 Seven Blackfoot Creek, into which this unnamed tributary
 drains, flows into Fort Peck Reservoir about halfway between
 Fred Robinson Bridge and the Fort Peck Dam.

Mrs Flygt's water right is in Basin 40EJ (Missouri River 8 9 between Bullwhacker Creek and Musselshell River), and is a 1942 stockwater claim for a system of reservoirs and collection 10 ditches on an unnamed tributary to Armelles Creek. (Kindle 11 Aff., Attach. 1.) The claimed flow rate is 160 miners inches 12 and the claimed volume is 280 acre feet. Id. Armelles Creek, 13 into which this unnamed tributary drains, flows into the 14 Missouri River at Fred Robinson Bridge. 15

While Mr. Weimer and Mrs. Flygt have met the initial 16 requirement in Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-233(1)(b) of having an 17 "ownership interest" in water, neither of them go on to make 18 the additional required showing that their rights are "affected 19 by the decree" (id.), or to specify the evidence upon which 20 such alleged adverse affect is based. Mont. Code Ann. 21 § 85-2-233(3); see also Water Court Procedural Rule 1.II(7). 22 The threshold "good cause" standard in Mont. Code Ann. 23 § 85-2-233 and the requirement that objectors specify how they 24 25 have been affected and the evidence in support of that allegation is an integral part of the general adjudication 26 process and essential to the efficient disposition of claims 27

The drafters of Mont. Code Ann. § 85-3-233 and objections. 1 sought to avoid clogging the adjudication process up with 2 extensive pretrial motion and discovery practice by requiring 3 all objectors to specify, up front, certain basic aspects of 4 their objection. Mr. Weimer and Mrs. Flygt have failed to meet 5 these basic requirements, and for that reason their objections 6 should be dismissed.² 7

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THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE COMPACT BECAUSE IT CONFORMS II. TO APPLICABLE LAW AND REFLECTS A FAIR, ADEQUATE, AND REASONABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE TRIBES' WATER RIGHT CLAIMS. 10 Under Montana law there are two ways a reserved water 11 right may be quantified and folded into the adjudication. One 12 is through the normal adjudication process (Mont. Code Ann. 13 § 85-2-217) and the other is through compact (Mont. Code Ann. 14 §§ 85-2-701 to -705.) This is the second water rights compact 15 In the first such to come before this Court for approval. 16 proceeding, involving the Northern Cheyenne-Montana Water 17 Rights Compact (Water Court Cause No. WC-93-1), the Court in 18 its Memorandum Opinion of August 3, 1995 held that it would 19 utilize the consent decree standards articulated in United 20 States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 21 sub nom., Makah Indian Tribe v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2889 22 (1991), and like cases to review compacts reached in accordance 23 with Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-703. 24

²If, in response to this motion, Mr. Weimer and Ms. Flygt 26 are able to factually allege the manner in which they are 27 adversely affected by the Compact, the State reserves the right to contest those allegations through discovery and trial.

Accordingly, before approving a compact "the court must be 1 satisfied that [the compact] is at least fundamentally fair, 2 adequate and reasonable . . . [and that it] conform[s] to 3 applicable law." (Mem. Op. at 6 (Aug. 3, 1995) No. WC-93-1); 4 see also Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 5 1438, 1445 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. City of Miami, 664 6 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981). The Court also quoted from 7 Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615, 625 8 (9th Cir. 1982), for the proposition that "[t]he relative 9 degree of importance to be attached to any particular factor 10 will depend upon, and be dictated by, the nature of the 11 claim(s) advanced, the type(s) of relief sought, and the unique 12 facts and circumstances presented by each individual case." 13 From the foregoing the key elements of the Court's review 14 can be deduced.] First, the Court needs to determine that the 15 Compact was validly entered into in accordance with the 16 statutory requirements, and that the parties have assented to 17 it in all material respects. Second, the Court must determine 18 that there are no serious or patent defects in the Compact or

19 the manner in which it determines or interprets the Tribal 20 Water Right. ["TWR"] Finally, the Court should determine that, 21 22 at least as a threshold matter, the Compact represents an "equitable" determination of the TWR which has a basis in law 23 and fact and which adequately describes it in a manner 24 consistent with Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-234(7). As will be 25 demonstrated below, all of these criteria are satisfied here 26 and the Compact should be approved. 27

The Compact Was Reached in Accordance With and Otherwise Conforms to Applicable Law.

Code Annotated 85-2-701 out three Montana S sets 3 conditions precedent to the submission of a water rights 4 compact to the water court for approval and incorporation into 5 the adjudication.)First / § 701(1) requires that negotiations 6 must be "commenced by the commission." <u>Id.</u> at (1). The 7 affidavit of Scott Brown establishes that negotiations were 8 (Brown Aff., ¶ 3.) / Second/, $\S 701(2)$ commenced in 1979. 9 provides that a compact must be agreed to by the Commission and 10 the involved tribe, approved by the "appropriate federal 11 authority, " and copies filed with the United States Department 12 of State, the Secretary of State of Montana, and the Tribe. 13 The Compact was approved by the Compact Commission on April 5, 14 1985, and copies thereof have been filed with the required 15 officials in accordance with that provision. (Brown Aff., 16 ¶ 15.) The memoranda in support of this motion which will be 17 filed by the Tribes and the United States will similarly 18 establish their respective approvals of the Compact. Lastly, 19 § 701(2) provides that the Compact must be ratified by the 20 Montana Legislature. As discussed earlier, the Compact was 21 1985 Mont. Laws, ratified by the Montana Legislature in 1985. 22 Ch. 735, § 1. All of the conditions precedent enumerated in 23 Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-701 have been met. 24

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1	B. <u>The Compact Represents a Fundamentally Fair,</u> <u>Reasonable and Adequate Determination of the</u>
2	Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes' Water Rights.
3	Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-235(7) requires that with respect
4	to a reserved water right a final decreeand by inference a
5	compactmust state:
6	(a) the name and mailing address of the holder of
7	the right; (b) the source or sources of water included in the
8	right; (c) the quantity of water included in the right; [and]
9	(d) the date of priority of the right;(e) the purpose for which the water included in the
10	right is currently used, if at all; (f) the place of use and description of the land,
11	if any, to which the right is appurtenant; (g) the place and means of diversion, if any, and
12	(h) any other information necessary to fully define the nature and extent of the right, including
13	the terms of [the] compact[].
14	See also Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-243(5). The Compact addresses
15	each of these elements in a manner that has a basis in law and
16	fact, and which is otherwise reasonable and equitable. Each
17	element listed in Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-235(7) will be
18	addressed briefly below:
19	1. Name and mailing address. III(A) provides that the
20	water right recognized in the Compact "is held in trust by the
21	United States for the Tribes." While the Compact does not
22	contain a specific mailing address for the United States, that
23	omission is harmless.
24	2. Source or sources of water. Article III I. of the
25	Compact provides that, upon certain specified conditions, the

27 right from the mainstem of the Missouri River, from Fort Peck

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Tribes may divert water in the exercise of the tribal water

Reservoir, and from tributaries to the Missouri River that flow 1 through or adjacent to the Reservation other than the Milk 2 River. It is not settled whether off-reservation sources may 3 be used to satisfy on-reservation reserved water rights. See 4 generally, Conference of Western Attorneys General, American 5 Indian Law Deskbook at 184-85 (1993 & Supp. 1996); 4 Waters and 6 Water Rights § 37.02(d) (1996). There is, however, precedent 7 for the recognition of a non-appurtenant source for a reserved 8 water right. E.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 596-98 9 (1963) (water from source two miles distant from reservation 10 decreed to tribe). Accordingly, the recognition of a non-11 appurtenant source for the TWR in the context of a negotiated 12 settlement involving a number of interlocking concessions 13 cannot be seen as unreasonable. 14

Quantity of water included in the right. Article 3. 15 III A. provides that the Tribes have a conditional right to 16 "the lesser of (I) 1,050,472 acre feet of water, or (ii) the 17 quantity of water necessary to supply a consumptive use of 18 525,236 acre feet per year for the uses and purposes set forth 19 in [the] Compact." The affidavit of Scott Brown explains how 20 the quantification of the TWR took place and the technical and 21 factual basis for the ultimate figure reached. (Brown Aff., 22 $\P\P$ 4-7.) As is clear from that affidavit and the attached 23 documentation, this quantity was the product of joint technical 24 work and has a basis in fact. As with any negotiated 25 settlement, the ultimate amount settled on was a part of the 26

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1 overall series of compromises reflected in the Compact. (Brown
2 Aff., ¶ 15.)

Priority date of right. The 1888 priority date of 4. 3 the TWR (see Compact, Art. III A.) was not disputed given the 4 fact that the Fort Peck Reservation was created by the same 5 Congressional Act which was held in Winters to give rise to a 6 reserved water right with an 1888 priority. (See Brown Aff., 7 The 1888 priority date is well grounded in law and in ¶ 8.) 8 fact. 9

The purpose of the right. The question of whether an . 5. 10 Indian tribe may use its reserved water right for purposes 11 other than the original purposes of the reservation has not 12 been definitively settled. Compare Arizona v. California, 344 13 U.S. 350 (1963), Report of Special Master at 265-66, with In Re 14 Big Horn River, 753 P.2d 76, 94-99 (Wyo., 1988); see generally 15 Indian Law Deskbook at 190-91 (1993 and Supp. 1995)); 4 Waters 16 & Water Rights § 37.02(a). However, that question was resolved 17 here by allowing the Tribes to use the Tribal Water Right on 1.8the Reservation without regard to whether that purpose is one 19 that is considered "beneficial" under state law, and off the 20 Reservation so long as the use is considered "beneficial" as 21 that term is defined by state law in effect at the time of the 22 use. Given the ambiguity of the law in this area, the 23 resolution of this question is reasonable. 24

6. Place of use and description of the land to which the
right is appurtenant. In addition to using the TWR on the
Reservation the Tribes may, subject to certain conditions,

market water off the Reservation from the Missouri River and 1 Fort Peck Reservoir. The question of whether a tribe may 2 market its water off-reservation has also not been definitively 3 settled. See generally Indian Law Deskbook at 190-91; 4 Waters 4 & Water Rights § 37.02(f). The right to market water off the 5 reservation was one of the most important points to the tribal 6 negotiators, who felt that it was necessary to allow the Tribes 7 to reap some economic benefit from their right. (Brown Aff., 8 The State's recognition of a tribal marketing right in 9 ¶ 11.) exchange for the Tribes' concessions with respect to protecting 10 non-Indian water users on the Reservation compromised a 11 significant part of the bargain that resulted in the Compact 12 and was reasonable. 13

Place and means of diversion. Article III E. 7. 14 provides that all persons using the Tribal Water Right must 15 comply with state law regulating the construction and operation 16 of facilities using or transporting water off the Reservation. 17 Article III J. provides that if water is diverted from Fort 18 Peck reservoir or from the mainstem of the Missouri River below 19 20 Fort Peck Dam, the Tribes must provide notice to the State and sufficient documentation to show that the diversion meets the 21 criteria listed in the paragraph, which mirror the criteria for 22 such diversion under state law. If water is diverted from 23 above Fort Peck Reservoir, the Tribes must comply fully with 24 25 state law and, in addition, must secure the approval of the Montana legislature. Obviously enough, compliance with state 26

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law, or requirements substantially similar to state law, is
 reasonable.

Other information necessary to fully define the 3 8. right. Under Article IV of the Compact the exercise of the TWR 4 is subordinated to certain specified uses of water under state 5 law occurring on the "north-south tributaries" to the Missouri 6 River (i.e. Porcupine Creek, Poplar River, Big Muddy Creek, 7 Little Porcupine Creek, Wolf Creek, Tule Creek and Chelsea 8 Given the fact that many of the state-based water Creek). 9 rights in those watersheds had priority dates junior to the 10 Tribes' reserved water rights, the protection of those rights 11 was one of the main priorities of the Commission in negotiating 12 the Compact and was the quid pro quo for concessions made to 13 the Tribes in the areas of marketing and quantity. 14 (Brown Aff., ¶ 10-11.) Accordingly, an evaluation of those other 15 elements must include a consideration of this element of the 16 Compact. The subordination provisions of Article IV evidence 17 the "give-and-take" nature of the negotiations and are strong 18 evidence of the overall reasonableness of the Compact.³ 19

22 ³The Compact also contains other provisions which relate to the administration of water rights on the Reservation 23 (Compact, Art. V), and the resolution of disputes between users 24 of the TWR and users of state water rights. Compact, Art VI. Since these additional provisions do not strictly relate to the 25 "determination and interpretation" of the TWR they will not be addressed in the memorandum at any length. They do, however, 26 provide further evidence of the overall reasonableness of the 27 Compact and the parties desire to comprehensively address water rights issues on the Reservation.

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Because the Compact Has Been Legislatively Ratified It Is Entitled to a Presumption of Reasonableness.

The Compact has been ratified by the legislative bodies of the State of Montana and the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes, and the duly authorized official of the United States government. While not dispositive of the question of whether the Compact should be approved, the State submits that such ratification gives rise to a presumption of reasonableness in favor of the compact which can be overcome only by a compelling showing to the contrary.⁴

Through the ratification process the Compact was thoroughly scrutinized by the Montana Legislature and the Tribes' Business Council, and its ratification by those entities represents a determination by each involved government that it represents an appropriate resolution of the Tribes' reserved water right claims. These findings should accordingly be recognized and implemented through the adoption of a presumption of reasonableness with respect to the Compact. Second, a presumption of reasonableness based on

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⁴ A presumption "is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action or proceeding." Mont. 22 R. Evid. 301. It generally has the effect of shifting either the burden of production or persuasion (or both) to one who 23 wishes to controvert the presumed fact. See generally Clifford 24 S. Fishman, Jones on Evidence § 4:4 (1992); Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, <u>Weinstein's Evidence</u> § 300[02] (1994). 25 A presumption may be created by a court for several reasons, including "probability . . . procedural economy, regularity 26 [and] convenience, and the implementation of social policy." 27 Jones at id. Each of these criteria is present here and supports the adoption of such a presumption.

legislative ratification is consistent with judicial economy 1 and convenience. The Montana Legislature, the Fort Peck Tribal 2 Council, and the United States have already considered the Compact in great detail. It would serve little purpose for the 4 Water Court to engage in a detailed review of the same unless 5 it is necessitated by a substantial objection or a patent 6 defect in the Compact. 7

Finally, public policy in Montana strongly favors the 8 negotiated resolution of Indian and federal reserved water 9 Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-701(1) specifically right claims. 10 provides that "it is . . . intended that the state of Montana 11 proceed under the provisions of [Mont. Code Ann. §§ 85-2-701 12 to -705] in an effort to conclude compacts for the equitable 13 division and apportionment of waters." This policy exists not 14 only in the interests of judicial economy but also because 15 litigants should be encouraged to determine their respective 16 rights between themselves. See, e.g., Feder v. Harrington, 58 17 FRD 171, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("In the normal case, there is a 18 public policy favoring settlement.") Adoption of a presumption 19 in favor of the reasonableness of a compact adopted and 20 ratified in accordance with Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-701 will 21 effectuate the State's public policy favoring settlement. 22

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The Objectors Cannot Meet Their Burden To Show How D. They Are Harmed And Why The Compact Should Be Rejected.

The primary effect of the presumption of reasonableness is 26 to shift the burden to the objectors to show how they are 27

harmed and give reasons why the Compact should be rejected. In 1 that regard the State assumes that Mr. Weimer and Mrs. Flygt 2 each will argue that the fact that the Tribes may have the 3 right to exercise a call upon their water rights constitutes 4 both an adverse affect and a reason why it should be rejected. 5 However, even if true, that fact that the Tribes may have the 6 right to exercise a call on Mr. Weimer's and Mrs. Flygt's water 7 rights does not rise to the level sufficient to meet the 8 requirement of Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-233. 9

The Tribes' potential rights to call Mr. Weimer's and 10 Mrs. Flygt's water rights⁵ stem not from the Compact but rather 11 from the fact that they possess senior federally-reserved water 12 rights downstream from them. The Compact does not create the 13 Tribes' rights, it simply recognizes and quantifies them. 14 Accordingly, in order to meet the required injury showing in 15 this context Mr. Weimer and Mrs. Flygt would have to 16 demonstrate that the rights recognized in the Compact differed 17 substantively from, or were significantly and arbitrarily 18 greater than, the rights the Tribes would have been decreed in 19 20 litigation.

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⁵The State takes no position on the question of whether such a call could, in fact, occur in light of the "futile call" doctrine. Given the extremely small size of Mr. Weimer's and Mrs. Flygt's claims, the odds that the Tribes would bother to exercise a call against them are extremely small. The fears of Mr. Weimer and Mrs Flygt that the Tribes would seek to secure water from Dry Armelles Creek and an unnamed tributary of Seven Blackfoot Creek, both ephemeral streams, rather than from the adjacent Fort Peck Reservoir, are simply illogical.

As demonstrated above, each element of the TWR, standing 1 alone, falls within the range of possible litigation outcomes. 2 Collectively, the entire Compact reflects careful and reasoned 3 balancing of the many issues raised by the quantification of 4 the Tribes' reserved water right claims and integration of 5 those rights into the existing state water right regime. 6 Moreover, if Mr. Weimer and Mrs. Elygt were successful in their 7 objections, the negotiated protections for the numerous state 8 water right holders on the Milk River and the north-south 9 tributaries, which would not exist but for the Compact, would 10 be placed at risk. On balance, the minor concerns they raise 11 do not outweigh the benefits of the Compact to the Tribes, the 12 State, and the protected non-Indian water users on the 13 Given the fact that Mr. Weimer and Mrs. Flygt Reservation. 14 have not shown that they are put in a worse position by the 15 Compact than they occupied prior to its ratification, there is 16 no basis upon which to conclude that it should be rejected. 17

CONCLUSION

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For the reasons set forth above, the State respectfully requests this Court to enter summary judgment dismissing all of the objections that have been filed with respect to the Compact

in accordance with Mont. Code Ann. approve and it to 1 \S 85-2-233(6) and -792(3). 2 day of <u>F</u> K 1997. DATED this 3 JOSEPH P. MAZUREK 4 Attorney General State of Montana 5 Justice Building 215 North Sanders P.O. Box 201401 6 59620-140 МТ Helena 7 8 By: HARRIS HARLEY R 9 Assistant Attorney General 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27